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Abstract: Sharing-economy firms have opposed the application of antidiscrimi-
nation law to their transactions. At the same time, these firms have heralded
their ability to achieve antidiscrimination aims without the force of law, and
have adopted various measures to address discrimination. This Article docu-
ments and assesses these measures, focusing on the relationship between law
and norms. Relying on the sharing economy as a case study, this Article shows
how law can play a crucial role in spurring antidiscrimination efforts by firms
that it does not regulate, but also how antidiscrimination law might nonetheless
be undermined by these voluntary efforts.
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Introduction
Sharing-economy firms have objected strenuously to the application of antidis-
crimination law to their transactions.1 At the same time, however, these firms
have touted their ability to achieve antidiscrimination goals,2 and have
*Corresponding author: Naomi Schoenbaum, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington
University School of Law, Washington, DC 20052, USA, E-mail: nschoenbaum@law.gwu.edu
1 See, e. g. Michelle Chen, Does the Law Decide What Rights Are Afforded to Uber Drivers—or Does
Uber? THE NATION (June 22, 2016), available at https://www.thenation.com/article/does-the-law-
decide-what-rights-are-afforded-to-uber-drivers-or-does-uber/; Claire Zillman, California’s Uber
Driver Decision Could Throw AWrench Into The Sharing Economy, FORTUNE (June 17, 2015), available
at http://fortune.com/2015/06/17/uber-drivers-are-employees-sharing-economy/. (attributing the
per-hour gender earnings gap to three factors: men having more experience; men driving in more
lucrative locations (driven largely by where drivers live and, to a lesser extent, safety), and men
driving faster).
2 Laura W. Murphy, Airbnb’s Work to Fight Discrimination and Build Inclusion: A Report
Submitted to Airbnb, at 27, BLOG.ATAIRBNB (Sept. 8, 2016), available at
http://blog.atairbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-
Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf. (“[T]he Airbnb community can promote empathy and
understanding across all cultures.”).
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voluntarily adopted measures to combat charges of discrimination.3 This Article
looks at these efforts, and considers their intersection with antidiscrimination
law, highlighting both how law can play a critical role in spurring antidiscrimi-
nation efforts by firms that it does not regulate, but also how antidiscrimination
law might nonetheless be undermined by these efforts.
Scholars have debated howmuch the regulatory force of law as compared with
the non-legal force of norms shapes behavior. The response of sharing-economy
firms to concerns of discrimination provides a fruitful opportunity to explore this
question in a context where we might think norms are operating particularly
powerfully, and also where we might think that law has played a critical role in
shaping these norms, and finally where we might be concerned to leave the
regulation of such a fundamental interest—equality—to forces outside of law.
Scholars’ focus on whether antidiscrimination law applies to the sharing
economy4 overlooks the way that norms can shape behavior, even without direct
legal regulation. The strong response of firms to concerns of discrimination
shows us just how far we have come in terms of the expectation of nondiscri-
mination in the provision of what have come to be seen as critical services,
including ride-sharing and home-sharing. Indeed, in some respects, antidiscri-
mination norms in the sharing economy appear to be ahead of law. For example,
sharing-economy firms have taken measures to address discrimination by indi-
vidual riders against drivers or by individual hosts against guests—discrimina-
tion that law typically wouldn’t regulate in the traditional economy. However,
the market response also reveals other respects in which norms of equality may
lag behind laws of equality in ways that are troubling, for example, in permitting
and even encouraging sex discrimination in intimate spaces to address safety
concerns. The market response to discrimination may also fail to accord with the
goals of antidiscrimination law and may even be intended to quell public
pressure for a regulatory response at all. So while market forces may regulate
more efficiently than law, we might be concerned about relying on these norms
to guarantee equality.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, this Article catalogues the con-
cerns of discrimination raised in the sharing economy and firms’ voluntary
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 See, e. g. Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommmodations: Race Discrimination
in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L. J. 1271 (2017) (focusing on how public accommodations law
applies to race discrimination in the sharing economy); Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 95–97 (2015), available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/
lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/. Rogers_Dialogue.pdf (focusing on how antidis-
crimination law applies to Uber).
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responses to these concerns. By voluntary, I mean responses that were not
mandated by the force of law, although I take up later how law has played a
role in shaping these responses. The focus here is on two sectors of the sharing
economy—ride-sharing and home-sharing—and two bases of discrimination—
race discrimination and sex discrimination—in the United States.5
Second, this Article looks at how law plays a role in shaping firms’ responses
to discrimination, even when firms claim not to be regulated by antidiscrimination
law. If sharing-economy firms operate in an ambiguous regulatory space, they will
have some incentive to implement antidiscrimination practices. So I first briefly
address whether antidiscrimination law does in fact cover the type of discrimina-
tion that firms have responded to, and express skepticism about this. I then
introduce law and norms scholarship to consider the respective roles of law and
norms—and their interaction—in the sharing-economy’s efforts to combat discri-
mination. Antidiscrimination law appears to have shaped norms and expectations
of nondiscrimination at work and in public accommodations such that the public
finds rampant discrimination in the sharing economy unacceptable, regardless of
whether antidiscrimination law regulates these transactions. I explore some of the
mechanisms by which law is influencing norms here, as well as some of the ways
that these norms diverge from law.
Third, I consider some of the consequences of addressing discrimination
through norms. Relying on the force of norms rather than the force of law
brings the benefit of lower enforcement costs, with arguably fewer incursions
on autonomy. However, relying on norms rather than law also raises concerns,
as this allows firms more leeway to pick and choose their responses. Equality is
an area where we typically want forward progress, and the market is more
likely to be (though not always) responding to current antidiscrimination
norms, rather than pushing them forward. Firms might also look for the cheap-
est means to avoid discrimination, without considering how the mechanisms
they rely on fail to comport with the goals of antidiscrimination law. Here, the
5 This phenomenon certainly stretches worldwide, see, e. g. Int’l Finance Corp., World
Bank Group, Driving Toward Equality: Women, Ride-Hailing, and the Sharing Economy (2018),
available at https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ec101088-8a12-4994-9918. 14455b8e2cd9/
00418 + IFC +DTE+Report_Complete_Layout + Final2-pxp.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; and to other
sectors of the peer-to-peer economy; see Ian Ayres, Mahzarin R. Banaji, & Christine Jolls,
Race Effects on Ebay, 46 RAND J. ECONOMICS 891 (2015) (documenting race discrimination
against sellers of baseball cards on Ebay by varying race of person holding the card), and
other forms of discrimination; Lynne Soraya, Disability and the Sharing Economy, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Aug. 11, 2014), available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/
201408/disability-and-the-sharing-economy. I narrow the focus here to make the analysis
tractable.
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biggest implication might be that by quelling public pressure for legal
responses to discrimination, firms’ antidiscrimination efforts reduce the like-
lihood that they will be governed by antidiscrimination law at all. Although
much could be said about the respective role that law and norms should play in
regulating discrimination in the sharing economy, this brief Article does not
take on this prescriptive task. Rather, it describes the intersecting ways that
law and norms are already shaping discrimination and antidiscrimination in
the sharing economy, highlighting a range of consequences, with an aim
toward building a foundation for future work.
I Discrimination and Antidiscrimination
in the Sharing Economy
Sharing-economy firms have strenuously objected to coverage by antidiscrimi-
nation law, claiming that they are not the types of entities covered by these
laws.6 At the same time, however, they have taken a variety of actions in
response to concerns of discrimination in the provision of their services.
Before the next two Parts seek to contextualize these responses and discuss
their implications, this Part catalogues some of the concerns of discrimination
that have been raised in the sharing economy and presents a typology of the
kinds of responses sharing-economy firms have taken to address these discrimi-
nation concerns.
A Discrimination
Concerns about discrimination in ride-sharing and home-sharing were not sur-
prising based on the relationship between intimacy and discrimination7 and the
tendency of sharing-economy firms to personalize the transactions, predicating
the transaction on the relationship between users rather than with the firm.8 Due
in large part to the lack of trust in these new firms and these new transactions
(e. g. riding in a stranger’s car or staying in a stranger’s home), sharing-economy
firms allowed themselves to recede into the background, and instead
6 See sources cited supra note 1.
7 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1187–90 (2015).
8 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023,
1033–35 (2016).
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emphasized the connection between the worker and the customer, whether it be
driver and rider or host and guest.9 Firms highlighted the personal character-
istics of users—including names, photographs, and ratings—to build trust in
these transactions.10
It did not take long before formal and informal charges of discrimination—
and the research to back it up—started filing in.11 In the home-sharing space,
lawsuits were brought against Airbnb for facilitating racial discrimination by
hosts against black guests, who claimed that they were rejected from bookings
because of their race.12 Research confirmed this tendency. One study found that
lodging requests by those with black-sounding names were sixteen percent less
likely to be accepted than those with white-sounding names.13
Similar concerns of discrimination by workers against customers have been
raised in the ride-sharing context. One study of Uber and Lyft found that riders with
African-American-sounding names waited thirty-five percent longer for rides
and were, in some areas, up to three times as likely to have their ride canceled
compared to their white counterparts.14 Concerns about the impact of race on
outcomes for ride-share drivers have also been raised. Uber has been sued for
9 See id.
10 See id. Scholars have long raised concerns about the ability to discriminate on the basis of
this information. See Ayres, Banaji, & Jolls, supra note 5, at 891 (documenting race discrimina-
tion against sellers of baseball cards on Ebay by varying race of person holding the card);
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–92
(2004).
11 See, e. g. Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination By Its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/airbnb-anti-dis
crimination-rules.html. (“For much of this year, Airbnb has been under fire over the ease with
which its hosts can reject potential renters based on race, age, gender or other factors. The
barrage of criticism began with a Harvard University study, snowballed with firsthand accounts
of discrimination from Airbnb guests and has prompted a lawsuit.”).
12 See Vauhini Vara, How Airbnb Makes It Hard to Sue for Discrimination, NEW YORKER (Nov. 3,
2016), available at https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/how-airbnb-makes-it-hard-
to-sue-for-discrimination; Katie Benner, Federal Judge Blocks Racial Discrimination Suit Against
Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (NOV. 1, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/technol
ogy/federal-judge-blocks-racial-discrimination-suit-against-airbnb.html.
13 See Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, 9
AM. ECON. J.: APP. ECON. 1 (2017), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.
20160213.
14 Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies, at 2,
NBER Working Paper No. 22,776 (Oct. 2016), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.
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race discrimination in its rating system.15 The suit alleges that Uber’s system for
rating drivers from one to five stars is racially discriminatory, as it allows drivers’
fate on the platform to turn on potentially discriminatory assessments by
riders.16
Concerns of sex discrimination have also been raised in the sharing econ-
omy. The same study finding race discrimination against Uber and Lyft riders
also found that female riders were subjected to longer rides than male riders,
which produced not only a more expensive ride for women, but also the
opportunity for the driver to “flirt[] to a captive audience.”17 Claims of sexual
harassment and sexual assault of both female drivers and female riders have
also been raised.18 Similar concerns of sexual assault have plagued the home-
sharing sector.19 While sexual harassment in the sharing economy has not
generally been recognized as sex discrimination as it has in the traditional
economy, at least when experienced by workers, it has been recognized as an
issue of women’s safety.20 At least one lawsuit has been filed focusing on the
safety concerns of ride-sharing for women.21
15 The plaintiff is a former Uber driver who was deactivated based on low passenger ratings,
which he claims are because he is Asian. See Hannah Levintova, Uber Just Got Hit with Another
Legal Fight, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 7, 2016, 7:46 PM) available at http://www.motherjones.com/
media/2016/10/uber-racial-bias-lawsuit-liss-riordan/.
16 The double bind for Uber may be its recent justification for not adding a tipping function to
its app because riders have racial biases, which would infect tipping and result in discrimina-
tory pay for drivers. See id. (“Which raises the question … if you know your customers
discriminate, then how can you have a system for determining who is going to be fired that
relies completely on customer rating?”).
17 Ge et al., supra note 14, at 2.
18 These claims range from what we might consider inappropriate flirting and come-ons to
criminal activity as serious as kidnapping and rape. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1044–45;
Lauren Gambino, Uber Faces Lawsuit in US over Two Alleged Sexual Assaults by Drivers, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:20 PM), available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/
oct/08/uber-lawsuit-alleged-sexual-assaults-boston-south-carolina.
19 Shivani Vora, Airbnb Sued by Guest Who Says a Host Sexually Assaulted Her, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/travel/airbnb-lawsuit-host-
sexual-assault.html.
20 HyreCar, How Safe Is Uber and Lyft for Female Drivers? HYRECAR BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017),
available at http://hyrecar.com/blog/uber-lyft-female-drivers-safety/; see Stacy Perman, Is Uber
Dangerous for Women? MARIE CLAIRE (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.marieclaire.com/
culture/news/a14480/uber-rides-dangerous-for-women.
21 See Gambino, supra note 18 (“What Uber does not share with riders is that making the choice
to hail a ride after drinking also puts them in peril from the Uber drivers themselves. … By
marketing heavily toward young women who have been drinking while claiming that rider
safety is its #1 priority, Uber is instead putting these women at risk.”).
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In addition, concerns of occupational sex segregation and a gender pay gap
have been raised in the ride-sharing context. Women make up a small percen-
tage of the ride-sharing workforce—just 14% of Uber drivers and 20% of Lyft
drivers.22 And women who do go into ride-sharing earn on average 34% less
per month than their male counterparts, though much of that is due to the fact
that women are more likely to drive part-time. These gendered aspects of ride-
sharing are reflective of the safety concerns discussed above and several other
factors, including men’s greater experience on the platform, as well as the fact
that they drive faster.23,24
B Antidiscrimination
This Section considers the sharing economy’s response to the concerns of dis-
crimination raised in the last Section. While claiming not to be regulated by
antidiscrimination law, these firms nonetheless have taken a variety of actions
to combat and remedy discrimination. This Section provides an analytical typol-
ogy of the different types of seemingly non-legal moves firms have made in
response to discrimination.
1 Nondiscrimination Policies
The major home-sharing and ride-sharing firms have nondiscrimination policies.
Last year Airbnb released a report detailing its antidiscrimination initiatives
taken in response to findings of discrimination on the platform and lawsuits
alleging race discrimination. Airbnb hired prominent advisers, including former
United States Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., to help formulate anti-bias
policies.25 One of these new policies was a requirement that all of Airbnb’s users
(hosts and guests) agree to its “community commitment”: “We believe that no
22 Patrick Sisson, Safr, a Female-Friendly Uber Alternative, Launches with Mission to Empower
Women, CURBED (Apr. 5, 2017, 5:02 PM), available at https://www.curbed.com/platform/amp/
2017/4/5/15195806/uber-safr-ridehailing-for-women.
23 See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1049 (discussing safety and other concerns that lower the
income of women drivers and discourage them from serving as ride-sharing drivers at all, including
the fact that themost lucrative driving times—weekendnights—are those that present themost safety
risks due to drunken passengers); Sisson, supra note 22 (“[S]afety concerns, which keep female
drivers from working the more lucrative late-night shifts, are a big reason for the pay discrepancy.”).
24 See Cook, et al., supra note 1.
25 See Benner, supra note 11.
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matter who you are, where you are from, or where you travel, you should be
able to belong in the Airbnb community. By joining this community, you commit
to treat all fellow members of this community, regardless of race, religion,
national origin, disability, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or age, with
respect, and without judgment or bias.”26
Airbnb also has a more specific nondiscrimination policy. With regard
to race (as well as color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, or marital status), Airbnb hosts may not decline a
guest, otherwise impose any different terms and conditions, or post any
listing or otherwise make any statement that discourages or indicates a
preference for or against any guest on this basis.27 With regard to sex,
Airbnb imposes the same policy, except when the host shares living space
(e. g. bathroom, kitchen, or common areas) with the guest.28 In those cir-
cumstances, the host may choose to make a unit available only to guests of
the host’s gender.29
Ride-sharing firms too have implemented nondiscrimination policies. Uber’s
community commitment states that “when you use Uber you will meet people
who may look different or think differently from you. Please respect those
differences. We want everyone to feel welcome when they use Uber.”30 Uber
specifically prohibits discrimination by drivers and riders, including refusing to
provide or accept services, based on race and sex (among other grounds).31 And
Uber has policies to combat sexual harassment and assault such as barring
users touching or flirting with other users, commenting on someone’s appear-
ance, and asking whether they are single, as well as a blanket no-sex rule
between drivers and riders.32
In addition to these substantive antidiscrimination policies, Airbnb “over-
hauled its enforcement protocols” as part of its 2016 antidiscrimination
response, including adding new tools to route discrimination concerns to trained
specialists.33 “If a guest or a host believes they have been discriminated against,
Airbnb will investigate their complaint and take action if the policy has been
26 Murphy, supra note 2, at 19.
27 Id. at 29.
28 Id. at 29–30.
29 Id.
30 Uber, Uber Community Guidelines, UBER (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), available at
https://www.uber.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/.
31 Uber, Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), available at
https://www.uber.com/legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/en/.
32 Uber, supra note 31.
33 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 11, 20.
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violated.”34 Among other enhanced enforcement policies, every guest who is
denied a reservation will receive information about Airbnb’s community stan-
dards and how to report instances of discrimination.35
Despite the addition of more robust reporting and investigation mechan-
isms, the penalties for violating Airbnb’s nondiscrimination policy are still not
clear.36 Airbnb did add a remedy for discrimination, so that if a guest is not able
to book a listing because she has been discriminated against, Airbnb will ensure
the guest finds a place to stay.37 However, Airbnb does not explain the con-
sequences for the discriminating hosts. While the enforcement mechanisms in
the ride-sharing context are less clear,38 the penalties are clearier. Uber’s policy
states that any rider or driver found to have violated its nondiscrimination policy
will lose access to Uber.39
2 New Personnel and Training
Sharing-economy firms have also responded to concerns of discrimination with
personnel changes. Airbnb, for example, has hired a permanent, full-time pro-
duct team to fight bias and promote diversity.40 And while Airbnb does not
consider its hosts to be employees, it is offering them training to help them learn
how to fight bias, and will highlight hosts that have undergone this training.41
Airbnb has also committed to becoming a more diverse company at the corpo-
rate level by implementing what it calls a “diversity rule,” which mandates that
34 Id. at 20.
35 See id. at 21.
36 In one instance from 2014, before the introduction of the new policy, AirBnB removed a
listing that banned gay couples. Nick Duffy, Accommodation Website Airbnb Removes Listing
That Banned Gay Couples, PINKNEWS (Nov 23, 2014), available at http://www.pinknews.co.uk/
2014/11/23/accomodation-website-airbnb-removes-listing-that-banned-gay-couples/.
37 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 21.
38 See Letter from Al Franken, U.S. Senator, to Travis Kalanick, Chief Executive Officer of Uber
Technologies, Inc., and Logan Green, Chief Executive Officer of Lyft, Inc. (Nov 2, 2016), available at
https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/letter/161102_UberLyft.pdf. [hereinafter Franken Letter] (ask-
ing Uber and Lyft whether they audit rider or driver cancellations for discrimination).
39 See Uber, supra note 31. Note the concern that Uber itself may exercise this power in ways
that concern us, using concerns of discrimination as an excuse to force out drivers who are
agitating for more rights, for example. I thank my commentator Shelly Kreiczer Levy for this
observation.
40 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 24.
41 See id. at 22.
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all candidate pools for senior-level positions include women and candidates
from underrepresented backgrounds.42
3 Depersonalization Mechanisms
As referenced above, sharing-economy firms personalized their transactions
between users, focusing on personal profiles and ratings, to build trust in these
newfangled transactions.43 As trust in these firms and their transactions grew,
reducing the need for personalization, so did concerns of discrimination,
pressing firms to reduce personalization.44 Firms responded to these twin
forces—the reduced need for trust and the increased concern about discrimina-
tion—by depersonalizing and sometimes even anonymizing their transac-
tions.45 Airbnb, for example, has expanded its instant booking program that
allows users to make a reservation without host approval.46 This takes away
the personal selection aspect of the transaction to reduce discrimination that
can arise from discretion. In addition, when a host rejects a reservation request
based on unavailability of the requested dates, Airbnb will again remove the
host’s discretion, automatically blocking the calendar for subsequent reserva-
tion requests for those dates.47 This reduces the host’s ability to rely on
unavailability as a cover for race discrimination.
Some have suggested that Airbnb take additional moves toward depersonaliza-
tion to target discrimination, including removing photographs from its guest pro-
files and allowing guests not to use their real names.48 But Airbnb would not
remove host or guest photos from its site because “photos are an important feature
that help build relationships and allow host and guests to get to know one another
before a booking begins,” which is “far different than merely facilitating an
42 See id. at 24. Uber has also relied on more diverse hiring to address concerns of discrimina-
tion at the corporate level. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Adds Two Women to Top Ranks Amid Work
Culture Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June , , : PM), available at https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2017-06-06/apple-executive-bozoma-saint-john-said-to-be-joining-uber.
43 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
44 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Intimacy and Equality in the Sharing Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 459 (Nestor Davidson, John Infranca, &
Michele Finck eds., 2019).
45 See id. at 463–66.
46 Murphy, supra note 2, at 22.
47 See id. at 20.
48 See, e. g. Jun Li et al., A Better Way to Fight Discrimination in the Sharing Economy, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://hbr.org/2017/02/a-better-way-to-fight-discrimina
tion-in-the-sharing-economy.
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anonymous transaction.”49 Instead, the firm would take more modest steps towards
depersonalization, such as “experiment[ing] with reducing the prominence of guest
photos in the booking process” and “better featur[ing] objective information” and
“reputation-enhancing data such as reviews and verified ID.”50
New sharing-economy firms have popped up to fill the void that Airbnb has
seemed to create in the home-sharing space. These firms specifically aim to
combat discrimination through “blind” platforms. Innclusive, a peer-to-peer
lodging site, has been developed as a more inclusive alternative to Airbnb. It
is specifically designed to “remove the possibility of bias.” Until hosts agree to a
booking, they cannot see a guest’s profile photo or personal information.
Instead, they see only their ratings.
Ride-sharing services have also relied on depersonalization to fight discri-
mination. Uber and Lyft match riders and drivers based on proximity, so they
cannot choose each other based on race—at least initially.51 But there are other
opportunities for both riders and drivers to discriminate. As for riders, once the
rider is matched with a driver, the rider will see the driver’s “name, license plate
number, photo, and rating—so you know who’s picking you up ahead of time.”52
This allows the rider to cancel the ride based on race or sex of the driver, but at a
cost, after having been matched with the driver, and having to wait for another
more distant driver.
As for drivers, Uber, the largest and most popular ride-sharing service, only
allows drivers to see a prospective rider’s name and photo after accepting a ride
request.53 And Uber’s deactivation policy allows the company to ban drivers
who cancel too many rides, which may help to reduce the chance that drivers
49 Murphy, supra note 2, at 23.
50 Id. (citing research that “reputation systems like review scores can significantly extend the
trust between dissimilar users,” and thus that “[m]aking review and other objective data more
readily available could help overcome some people’s inclination to only trust people who are
like them”); Ray Fisman & Michael Luca, Fixing Discrimination in Online Marketplaces, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Dec. 2016), available at https://hbr.org/2016/12/fixing-discrimination-in-online-mar
ketplaces. (explaining that HomeAway shows photos only of the property for rent and withholds
photos until a later page or doesn’t show them at all).
51 Uber, Trip Safety: Our Commitment to Riders, UBER (last visited Mar. 7, 2018) available at
https://www.uber.com/ride/safety/. (“All ride requests are blindly matched with the closest
available driver.”)
52 Id.
53 See Fisman & Luca, supra note 50; Ge et al., supra note 14, at 2. Other ride-sharing services
retain a more personal character. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1035 (discussing ways in
which Lyft offers a more personal service than Uber). Lyft drivers see both the name and photo
of the rider prior to accepting or denying a ride. In theory, this should make it easier for Lyft
drivers to discriminate against riders. But it appears that Uber drivers are accomplishing the
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will cancel once they know a rider’s identity. It is not clear whether either Uber
or Lyft audit driver cancellations for discrimination.54
4 Safety Features
Sharing-economy firms have implemented features to respond to safety con-
cerns generally, which could play a role in addressing concerns of harassment
and assault against women users.55 Uber, for example, lists among its safety
features that it automatically finds the rider’s location and provides door-to-
door service; provides the rider and driver with information about each other
(name, license plate, photo, and rating) after they are matched to make sure
they are connecting with the right person; allows riders and drivers to share
information about the trip with friends and family so that they can follow the
route and know when to expect a rider; logs GPS data to keep a record of each
trip; provides round-the-clock support if any concerns arise; and assists law
enforcement with investigations.56
A new ride-sharing firm in Boston, Safr, offers additional safety features
“with the needs of women in mind.”57 Safr provides a range of mechanisms
intended to promote safety beyond the likes of Uber and Lyft, including vetting
each driver with an in-person interview and driving session; conducting the
same discrimination—just by cancelling after the ride has been accepted. See Ge et al., supra
note 14, at 2.
54 See Franken Letter, supra note 38 (asking Uber and Lyft whether they engage in such
measures).
55 Safety concerns can of course affect users of any sex. Even treating these safety features as
antidiscrimination measures may reinforce stereotypical notions of women as weak and in need of
defense. However, just like sexual harassment in the traditional economy, sexual harassment and
assault in the sharing economy can be an issue of sex equality not only because it disproportio-
nately affects women, but because it can be carried out in ways that reinforce traditional gender
norms. For a discussion of sexual harassment as a tool of gender norm enforcement, see generally
Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997), and Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
56 Uber, supra note 51; Uber, Safety and Confidence Behind the Wheel: Our Commitment to
Drivers, UBER (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), available at https://www.uber.com/drive/safety/. Some
of Uber’s safety claims and a safety fee it charged for conducting background checks on drivers
have been challenged in a lawsuit. See Biz Carson, Uber Generated Almost $500 Million From
“Safe Rides” Fees, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:43 PM), available at http://www.busi
nessinsider.com/uber-449-million-safe-rides-fees-2016-8.
57 Safr, Safr Is a Mission-Driven Ridesharing Company Built with the Needs of Women in Mind,
SAFR (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), available at https://www.gosafr.com/about-safr/.
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“most comprehensive background checks available” of drivers’ criminal and
motor vehicle history; offering drivers a bystander awareness and ride-safety
training session; paying drivers more than the industry standard so they are
incentivized to provide better service; providing round-the-clock real-time mon-
itoring of rides and an “SOS” button that either rider or driver can hit if they are
uncomfortable with their ride; and assigning a color to drivers and riders that
must be verified to ensure the driver picks up the correct rider.58
5 Identity-Based Responses
One response to concerns of sexual harassment and assault of women has
been to meet discrimination with discrimination. Lyft began as a ride-sharing
service for women only.59 Years later, Safr was developed as a women-only
ride-sharing service,60 but decided to include men too out of concern of legal
liability.61
58 See id.
59 See Ellen Huet, Why Aren’t There More Female Uber and Lyft Drivers? FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyftdrivers.
60 See Jaclyn Reiss, New Ride-Hailing Service Coming to Boston Caters Only to Women, BOSTON
GLOBE (Mar. 25, 2016), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/03/24/new-mass-
startup-like-uber-lyft-but-for-women/1LmxftfcQDvl5GihRu9YNM/story.html. (explaining that “[t]
his service is tailored so passengers can enjoy their commutes testosterone free, with drivers who
are less likely to hit on them and have undergone a thorough vetting process,” and also that “[d]
rivers of this service will not need to perfect a stern but non-confrontational ‘don’t fuck with me’
tone when passengers reach to touch their wrist”). More troublingly, the founder of Safr also cites
the film Pretty Woman and the relationship between the businessman and the down-on-her-luck
hooker as formative of his protective disposition to members of the opposite sex. Id.
Sex-matching may also allow for enhanced intimacy. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at
1041–42; Susan Zalkind, Confessions of a Female Uber Driver: Women-Only Rideshare Has Many
Pluses, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2016, 8:00 AM), available at https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/apr/21/chariot-for-women-female-only-rideshare-uber. (noting that “the most
satisfying part about this set up: the potential for great conversation. Driving people from place
to place, the backseat of a taxi, or rideshare car, often seamlessly turns into a confessional
booth. The conversations I had with women were always refreshingly frank. Sometimes the
subject matter veered into more serious territories, like loneliness, in vitro fertilization and
sexual assault. … I became adept at reviewing the pros and cons of online dates. I pondered
with my passenger as I pulled her up to meet a prospective suitor only to find he was wearing a
particularly bold pair of velour pants. For my own part, I entertain my female riders with tales
of less peaceful commutes, like my misadventures with the men’s lacrosse team).
61 Curt Woodward, Can “Uber for Women” App Really Refuse Service to Men? It Might Soon Find
Out., BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 26, 2017), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/
26/uber-for-women-app-close-launch-boston-amid-legal-questions/sy1pBJoTCCsW3husELGVeI/
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Although completely sex-segregated services have ultimately been dropped,
what has remained in some sharing-economy firms is the ability to choose one’s
transacting partner on the basis of sex.62 Sidecar, a one-time competitor to Uber
and Lyft, offered this option,63 and Safr now does.64 Safr sells this feature as a
corrective to occupational segregation and the pay gap in the ride-sharing
industry.65 Currently, all of Safr’s drivers are women.66
Even the biggest sharing-economy firms allow for some overt reliance on
sex. As referenced above, Airbnb users may discriminate on the basis of sex
when living spaces are shared.67 And Uber has suggested that focusing on the
sex of its drivers can remedy safety concerns. In the wake of such concerns, Uber
pledged to hire one million women drivers.68
story.html; Curt Woodward, Uber, But for Women? Probably Illegal, Experts Say, BOSTON GLOBE
(Mar. 28, 2016), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/03/28/uber-but-for-
women-probably-illegal-experts-say/QP5fYbQfvXUnKcEs0BqhEP/story.html.
62 See Hiawatha Bray, Hitchhiking Goes Digital with Tripda Ride Sharing Service, BOSTON GLOBE
(Nov. 21, 2014), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/21/hitchhiking-
goes-digital-withtripdaride-sharing-service/4JjciQxKybC2FD7HymwxUK/story.html.
63 See Johana Bhuiyan,Men Are Using Uber’s Lost-and-Found Feature to Harass Female Drivers,
BUZZ FEED (Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://www.buzzfeed.com/johanabhuiyan/faced-with-
harassment-female-uber-drivers-often-left-to-fend#.ojJ9JMAq3. (introduced this option, many of
their female drivers reported an increase in ride requests from female passengers); Kaleigh
Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women Passengers Choose Women Drivers, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 6,
2015), available at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-doesnt-uber-let-women-passengers-
choose-women-drivers. One now-defunct long-distance ride-sharing service, Tripda, also
allowed drivers to choose only female passengers. See Bray, supra note 62.
64 available at https://www.gosafr.com/riders/. (“We give you the power to choose the gender
of your driver. Man or woman, we’ll get you where you need to go safely.”).
65 See Sisson, supra note 22 (explaining that “gender preference option for drivers will get more
women in the driver’s seat and help them make more money”). Other Safr features are also
intended to serve this function as well. See id.; supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text
(listing safety features offered by Safr).
66 See id.
67 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
68 See Uber, Meet the Uber Team Driving Our Women Partner Program, UBER (July 27, 2015),
available at http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/meet-the-uber-team-driving-our-women-part
ner-program/. (one million women drivers globally by 2020); Jessica Goldstein, You Shouldn’t
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II The Force of Law in the Antidiscrimination
Response
This Part addresses the role of law in the seemingly non-legal antidiscrimina-
tion responses by sharing-economy firms. It first evaluates whether antidiscri-
mination law does regulate the type of discrimination that firms have
responded to, and expresses skepticism about this, laying the groundwork
for the role of norms here. Next, it highlights some of the most notable facets
of the antidiscrimination norms that appear to be at work in the sharing
economy, contextualizing them within the law and norms literature. Finally,
the Part considers the interaction between law and norms here, considering the
ways in which law—even when it is not regulating—plays a critical role in
shaping norms of nondiscrimination in the sharing economy.
A Law’s Regulatory Force
There is reason to believe that current antidiscrimination law, including public
accommodations law (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), fair housing law
(the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), and
employment discrimination law (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), does
not cover sharing-economy transactions. These laws generally do not cover
discrimination by individual suppliers of services or by individual customers,
and thus they are unlikely to apply to individual sharing-economy users them-
selves (hosts, guests, drivers, and riders), except to the extent that home-sharing
hosts are acting more like hotels in that they are renting out multiple dwellings
that are not owner-occupied.69
As for the firms themselves, the main focus of coverage here, they have so
far largely successfully claimed that they are not the types of entities covered
by these laws, in that they are not hotels covered by public accommodations
law or brokers covered by fair housing law or employers covered by fair
employment laws.70 Rather, they are simply networks or platforms that provide
69 See, e. g. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining a covered “employer” as one with “fifteen or more
employees”); James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy
Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 605 (1999) (describing so-
called Ms Murphy exception to the FHA, which exempts from coverage a dwelling has four or
fewer rental units with the owner living in one of those units).
70 One federal court has rejected Uber’s claim on summary judgment that it is not an employer,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015), but this ruling is on appeal,
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the means for people to connect in the exchange of these services. Even to the
extent that antidiscrimination law covers sharing-economy firms, many of
these laws contain exceptions for discrimination in intimate settings, and
these exceptions might apply in the more intimate settings of sharing-economy
transactions.71
B Norms
This Section considers the role of norms in the sharing-economy’s antidiscrimi-
nation responses.72 Before proceeding forward, two clarifications are in order.
First, the focus here is on norms related to discrimination, but there are surely
other non-legal forces at play behind some of the firms’ actions described in Part
I.B.73 Second, by focusing on norms, I do not mean to ignore the role of law in
generating norms. Rather, I mean to explore how norms (and the attitudes and
and drivers must contend not only with this issue but also with questions about the appro-
priateness of class action certification and even litigation in light of arbitration agreements the
drivers signed. Regardless of the merits of their legal position, sharing-economy firms have
gained a leg up in advocating for it because of legal silos and first-mover advantages, as
described by Professor Diane Ring in this volume. See Diane Ring, Silos and First Movers in
the Sharing Economy Debates, 13 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 61 (2019).
71 See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1064–65 (describing bona fide occupational qualification
under Title VII and the Mrs. Murphy exception under the FHA).
72 There is some overlap with corporate social responsibility, although that concept tends to
refer to corporate behavior for societal rather than shareholder benefit, regardless of whether
it is regulated by law. See David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979) (defining the term “to denote the obligations and inclinations, if
any, of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends that conflict with
the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit”).
73 Some changes may have been prompted by consumer demand. Airbnb believes that trave-
lers accustomed to hotels have come to expect that they can have hosts who act like hotel staff
members, who blend into the background or who won’t be there at all. Note that market forces
and concerns about discrimination may be linked. For example, Airbnb’s expansion depends
partly on whether people of different nationalities and ethnicities feel welcome to the platform.
And making sure that the firm is open to all can be a boon to business simply as a matter of
reputation.
As for depersonalization, once the sharing economy matured to a point where sufficient trust
had been built in the transactions themselves as well as the firms that offered them, firms might
have decided that the business costs of personalization were not worth it. As in the traditional
economy, relying too much on relationships between consumers and workers risks the relation-
ship between the consumer and the firm. See Schoenbaum, supra note 7, at 1212–13. A firm like
Uber ultimately wants riders to keep coming back to Uber rather than to any particular driver on
the platform.
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preferences that underlie them) are playing a role here. The complex interaction
between how law shapes norms, attitudes, and preferences will be taken up in
the next Section.
As an initial matter, it is worth saying a few words about what the literature
means when it refers to norms, and the two different types of norms that are
operating here. When referring to norms, the literature refers to “informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized
sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”74
There are two ways in which antidiscrimination norms may be operating in the
context of the sharing economy, and it is important to make these two different
mechanisms apparent. Norms “may be created and enforced in a centralized or
decentralized manner.”75 To illustrate this distinction, Professor Richard
McAdams gives the example of norms being generated and enforced by a
centralized private organization, such as a diamond exchange, as a matter of
relatively formal, typically written, rules, as compared with groups or whole
societies enforcing informal rules, such as the property norms that ranchers
follow in Shasta County, California.76
Here, the policies and other mechanisms firms have adopted to address
discrimination in the sharing economy are examples of centralized norms. But
decentralized norms of nondiscrimination may also play quite a big role in
shaping the development of the centralized norms adopted by firms. If decentra-
lized norms of discrimination affect sharing-economy users’ responses to these
firms (i. e., if users’ own strong antidiscrimination norms mean that they are less
likely to use Uber if Uber fails to respond to concerns of discrimination)77 then
firms are of course motivated to comply with these decentralized norms of
nondiscrimination.
Apart from whether these norms are generated and enforced in a centralized
or decentralized manner, another point to clarify is whose norms these are, i. e.,
in which population they operate. Norms may govern the behavior of particular
74 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 340 (1997).
75 See id. at 351.
76 See id. (citing the work of Lisa Bernstein and Robert Ellickson respectively for these two
different examples).
77 For a relevant example, consider the example of the Uber boycott for its CEO Travis Kalanick
serving on President Trump’s economic advisory council. See Julia Carrie Wong, Uber CEO Steps
Down from Trump Advisory Council After Users Boycott, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 2:25 AM),
available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/02/travis-kalanick-delete-uber-
leaves-trump-council.
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groups, or they may govern the behavior of society as a whole.78 While anti-
discrimination norms have certainly come a long way over the decades, there is
still some lack of societal consensus over norms of antidiscrimination. This is
certainly true for specific norms of antidiscrimination, such as sex discrimina-
tion in intimate spaces like bathrooms or a gynecologist’s office, but, as recent
political events have revealed, perhaps this is true for antidiscrimination norms
more generally.79 Decisionmakers at sharing-economy firms generating and
enforcing centralized antidiscrimination norms do tend to come from a particu-
lar demographic background (think wealthier, more educated, whiter, more
coastal), perhaps calling into question the generality of these norms.80 And
the customers who use their services (to whom firms may be disproportionately
responding) also tend to come from a wealthier and more educated
demographic.81
The remainder of this Section highlights a few of the most interesting facets
of antidiscrimination norms in the sharing economy. Firms seem far more
focused on discrimination by individuals against individuals rather than the
role that the firm plays in generating the circumstances in which this discrimi-
nation arises. This is not true across-the-board, as the firms have sometimes
focused on ways in which the firm enables discrimination.82 But it can be seen
with the lack of focus on the way that certain core firm policies—like a ratings
system—perpetuate bias.83 And it can be seen with the many charges of race and
sex discrimination that have been lodged by corporate employees against the
big sharing-economy firms, especially Uber.84 So even as these companies
78 See McAdams, supra note 74, at 386.
79 I am thinking of the rise of racist right-wing groups in the age of Trump.
80 Melanie Ehrendranz, Uber Hires a Much-Needed Diversity and Inclusion Officer, GIZMODO
(Jan. 23, 2018, 1:45 PM), available at https://gizmodo.com/uber-hires-a-much-needed-diversity-
and-inclusion-office-1822340174. (reporting that Uber “is predominantly white and male, like
the rest of Silicon Valley,” and that “women make up less than a third of the company, with no
black or Latinx employees in tech leadership”).
81 Aaron Smith, On-Demand: Ride-Hailing Apps, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 19, 2016), avail-
able at http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/on-demand-ride-hailing-apps. (finding that
ride-sharing riders tend to be younger, wealthier, more educated, and more liberal than the
general population).
82 See supra notes 40–42, 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing how Airbnb responds to
discrimination); supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing blind-matching of riders and
drivers on Uber).
83 See Alex Rosenblat et al., Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings as Vehicles for
Workplace Discrimination, 9 POL’Y & INTERNET 256 (2017).
84 Reuters, Uber Sued for Alleged Racial, Gender Discrimination, FORTUNE (Oct. 25, 2017),
available at http://fortune.com/2017/10/25/uber-sued-alleged-racial-gender-discrimination/.
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deploy strict nondiscrimination polices that apply to their users, they themselves
may be perpetuating the discrimination of others or discriminating themselves
in myriad ways.
This highlights how antidiscrimination norms in the sharing economy differ
from antidiscrimination law. In at least one way, these norms seem to extend
further than antidiscrimination law. The nondiscrimination policies of sharing-
economy firms bar individual workers and customers from discriminating
against each other.85 The law, on the other hand, has yet to regulate discrimina-
tion by individual customers against workers, or by individual workers against
customers, unless it also leads the regulated firm to violate the law.86
In other ways, antidiscrimination norms in the sharing economymirror features
of antidiscrimination law. Take the distinction between race and sex discrimination.
Both antidiscrimination norms and antidiscrimination law take a stricter approach
to race discrimination than sex discrimination. As a matter of antidiscrimination
law, the Constitution scrutinizes race discrimination more rigorously than sex
discrimination.87 Federal public accommodations law bans discrimination on the
basis of race but not sex.88 Employment discrimination law contains a bona fide
occupational qualification exception for sex but not race. As I have discussed
before, many of these distinctions are most relevant in intimate contexts.89
Antidiscrimination norms in the sharing economy are likewise more defer-
ential to sex than race discrimination. Airbnb expressly treats race and sex
differently in intimate contexts. When shared living spaces are involved, hosts
and guests may discriminate on the basis of sex but not race.90 In some ways,
the different treatment of race and sex by antidiscrimination norms seems to
85 See supra notes 26–27, 31 and accompanying text (noting also exception permitting sex
discrimination in shared living spaces on Airbnb).
86 See Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223,
225 (2016).
87 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV.
69, 79 n.37.
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin.”).
89 See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1064–65.
90 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. Interestingly, though, the exception does not
extend to sexual orientation. I have written previously about the reasons behind the permission
for sex discrimination in intimate spaces and posited that one such force was concerns about
unwanted sexuality. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1042–43; Heteronormativity in Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 245 (2017). But Airbnb’s policy, which permits discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex while banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, must be
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extend further than it does under antidiscrimination law. Firms have relied on
sex segregation and sex discrimination to address concerns of sexual assault
and sexual harassment in ways that the law likely would not cognize.91 While
sex-segregated firms have given way to a simple ability to choose based on sex,
the fact that sex-matching between worker and customer is considered a plau-
sible option and race-matching between worker and customer is not reflects a far
looser antidiscrimination norm on the basis of sex than on the basis of race—at
least when it comes to sex discrimination as classification.
C Other Forces of Law
Law can shape norms.92 This means that law can accomplish its goals indirectly,
by changing underlying attitudes and preferences, rather than by directly reg-
ulating behavior. Law can play this role through a number of mechanisms.
The law can express values, which can influence behavior.93 One way of the
law expressing value is by changing the social meaning of conduct.94 Professor
Larry Lessig has described how this occurred in the context of antidiscrimination
law. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, if a firm were to serve or
employ black people, they were doing so voluntarily, and this meant either that
the firm was greedy (by angling for more business or hiring at lower wages) or a
sympathizer. This social meaning was dangerous for firms, as it might alienate
white customers and workers.95 After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, serving
black customers and hiring black workers was mandated, and removed the old
grounded in other interests, such as comfort, safety, or a desire for more (non-sexual) intimacy.
See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1038–46.
91 See supra note 59–68 and accompanying text. Although one Supreme Court precedent does
allow sex to serve as a BFOQ in response to safety concerns, there are reasons to think this
reasoning would not apply here. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1064.
92 See, e. g. McAdams, supra note 74, at 349; Janice Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and
Social Groups, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 60, 72 (2017) (recognizing “the ways in which social norms
and law mutually influence each other”). There is a vast literature on the interaction between
law and social norms. The treatment here only ever so slightly skims the surface. My goal is
merely to provide the most modest of introductions for those uninitiated to the field.
93 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996); Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 241 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman
eds., 2013).
94 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,  U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 965–67
(1995); Sunstein, supra note 93, at 2043–44.
95 See Lessig, supra note 94, at 965–67.
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meaning from this conduct. In this way, law can change not only the social
meaning of the conduct, but also our moral evaluation of those who engage in
the conduct.96
Law can also serve more material functions in changing norms. In a law and
economics framework, law expands the choice set in markets of norms.97 Law can
also serve information and coordination functions.98 As for information, legal
rules can cause individual citizens to update their beliefs, because law provides
new information.99 For example, new law can signal a change in attitude. Law
can also provide information not only of social approval or disapproval of
particular conduct, but of a societal calculus of costs and benefits.100 Law facil-
itates coordination by serving as a focal point for conduct and decisionmaking.101
Scholars have noted how antidiscrimination law has been especially impor-
tant in changing norms of discrimination.102 While the exact role has been
debated,103 scholars have provided some convincing data and examples to
support this notion. For example, Professors Kenworthy Bilz and Janice Nadler
highlight the quite stark turnaround in norms relating to sexual harassment of
women in the workplace after the law began to recognize it as a form of sex
discrimination.104 We can see this in the generally quite outraged reactions to
current revelations of sexual harassment by high-profile men, even where the
conduct would not be unlawful, because, for example, there is no employer-
employee relationship. Despite the fact that law is not regulating, it seems that
sexual harassment law has helped to generate norms of how we expect men to
treat women with whom they have business relationships. As Bilz and Nadler
explain, law can be especially effective at shifting norms when the regulation
96 See id.
97 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy,
in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
98 See RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 6, 9 (2015).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 8–9.
102 See, e. g. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 2044, 2052.
103 Compare John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1338–39 n.6 (1989) (arguing that law has played a key role
in shifting our attitudes toward nondiscrimination, and, in particular, toward incorporating
women fully and equally into the workplace), with Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Sex Discrimination Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1321–25 (1989) (arguing that sex discrimination
in the workplace would have declined significantly without the force of law, and citing “no
evidence of large [positive] effects” of law on the position of women in the workplace).
104 Bilz & Nadler, supra note 93, at 241–43.
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changes attitudes about the underlying morality of behavior, as we can suspect
might have happened in the context of sexual harassment.105
In the circumstances of antidiscrimination norms in the sharing economy,
we can see a few especially interesting ways in which antidiscrimination law has
played a role in shaping antidiscrimination norms precisely because there is a
domain of law relevant to the transactions at issue, even if it doesn’t apply to
these transactions. First, sharing-economy firms have adopted antidiscrimina-
tion law—even when it doesn’t apply—as the baseline for acceptable conduct.
Uber bars its users from discriminating on the basis of a list of characteristics, as
well as “any other characteristic protected under applicable federal or state
law.”106 Airbnb requires that its hosts “familiarize [them]selves with all applic-
able federal, state, and local laws that apply to housing and places of public
accommodation.” In this way, law may be incorporated expressly into antidis-
crimination norms.
Second, even when sharing-economy firms don’t adopt the legal standard, we
can sometimes see law being used as a yardstick. Firms may rely on a comparison
of their policies with legal standards (whether they apply or not) as a signal of the
strength of their antidiscrimination policies. For example, Uber has advertised its
safety standards as going beyond what the law requires in terms of background
checks for drivers in the cognate taxi industry. And Airbnb has advertised its
nondiscrimination policy as “stronger than what is required by law.”107 So at the
same time these firms claim not to be regulated by law, they rely on law to convey
that their policies and practices are adequate and perhaps even superior to law.
Notably, in both the baseline and yardstick conditions, law is providing a floor for
antidiscrimination norms, which firms sometimes exceed.108
105 See id. at 241 (“[I]f laws change moral attitudes, we reduce—maybe drastically—the need
for the state to act on or even monitor regulated players.”). Once we recognize the interaction
between law and norms—both how law can shape norms and how norms can shape law—there
is a chicken-and-egg problem: which came first, the law or the norm? We can imagine that at
least in some circumstances, there may be a positive feedback loop operating between law and
norms. The norms change enough for there to be a change in the law, which in turn fuels more
norm change, and so on.
106 See Uber, supra note 31.
107 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 11; id. at 20 (“The new policy requires Airbnb hosts and guests
to do significantly more than merely follow applicable laws.”); id. at 28 (“While hosts are
required to follow all applicable laws that prohibit discrimination based on such factors as race,
religion, national origin, and others listed below, we commit to do more than comply with the
minimum requirements established by law.”);
108 Note that equality is not always a unidirectional vector. Sometimes the antidiscrimination
rights of some (e. g. gay and lesbian customers) presses (or are at least claimed to press) on the
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Third, the existence of a relevant area of antidiscrimination law, even if it
doesn’t regulate discrimination in the sharing economy, legitimates government
oversight of discrimination in the sharing economy. For example, after the
release of research finding discrimination in the ride-sharing sector, Senator Al
Franken sent letters to Uber and Lyft asking questions about concerns of
discrimination raised by this research.109
Finally, the filing of discrimination lawsuits against sharing-economy firms
serves several functions, even when the law doesn’t apply.110 These lawsuits may
help to underscore the morally troubling meaning of discriminatory conduct in
the sharing economy.111 While individual sharing-economy users have com-
plained of norm violations without law,112 the filing of the lawsuit and the
invocation of antidiscrimination law113 make the moral dimension of the discri-
minatory conduct, and the societal consensus around it, far more salient.114 This is
especially so because of the moral dimension of antidiscrimination law.115
Such lawsuits also help to provide publicity needed for the development,
enforcement, and reinforcement of norms.116 As Professor McAdams has
explained, publicity is important to the development of norms because it
makes sure that two other conditions of norm development—consensus around
the norm and risk of detection of norm violation—are known to the relevant
community. The filing of discrimination lawsuits in the sharing economy
appears to have served these functions.117 The filing of the lawsuit makes the
antidiscrimination rights of others (e. g. religious service providers). See, e. g. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd v. Col. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
109 See Franken Letter, supra note 38.
110 See supra notes 11–12, 15 and accompanying text (citing such lawsuits).
111 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing how law can affect the meaning
of conduct).
112 Maggie Penman & Shankar Vedantam, #AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes the Sharing
Economy, NPR (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:10 AM), available at https://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-
airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-bias-shapes-the-sharing-economy. (discussing the Twitter hashtag
#AirbnbWhileBlack used by those who felt that they had experienced race discrimination on the
platform).
113 See supra notes 11–12, 15 and accompanying text (citing antidiscrimination lawsuits filed
against sharing-economy firms).
114 See MCADAMS, supra note 98, at 3 (discussing how law serves the function of expressing
moral consensus around a norm).
115 See Bilz & Nadler, supra note 93, at 241.
116 See MCADAMS, supra note 74, at 362 (discussing the role of publicity in the development of
norms).
117 See, e. g. supra notes 11–12, 15 (citing articles reporting on these lawsuits).
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norm violation public, which helps to enforce the norm by making a penalty for
the violation more likely. While the rise of social media has meant that indivi-
duals can publicly surface norm violations without law,118 the filing of a lawsuit
makes mainstream media coverage more likely,119 which brings broader pub-
licity and greater salience and veracity to the norm violation. Airbnb’s decision
to take more substantial action against discrimination on its platform followed
shortly on the heels of a race discrimination lawsuit filed against the firm.120 The
plaintiff in that case claimed that the Airbnb did nothing after he complained
directly to the firm, suggesting that the lawsuit itself was significant in prompt-
ing action.121
III Implications
This Part considers some of the benefits and costs of the fact that thus far the
regulation of discrimination in the sharing economy has been largely left up to
norms rather than the force of governing law. This Article offers only a brief
survey of a select set of implications, and thus refrains from reaching any
concrete conclusions, preferring instead to highlight some primary areas of
contention.
As an initial matter, regulating behavior through norms is cheaper than
regulating through law.122 When the cost of legal regulation is especially high,
such as in the context of regulating discrimination by individual customers,
where we might think it undermines autonomy,123 the role of norms may be
especially important. This highlights how, when we are thinking about whether
the law should regulate discrimination in a particular context, we should recog-
nize that the relevant comparison is not law or no law, but law or norms, as
norms will often be operating. This also means that when we consider whether
118 See Penman & Vedantam, supra note 112.
119 See supra notes 11–12, 15 and accompanying text (discussing media coverage of antidiscri-
mination lawsuits against sharing-economy firms).
120 See Benner, supra note 11 (linking Airbnb’s adoption of rules to fight discrimination by its
hosts to the filing of the lawsuit, among other events).
121 See Hope King, Airbnb Sued for Racial Discrimination, CNN (May 18, 2016, 4:56 PM),
available at https://money.cnn.com/2016/05/18/technology/airbnb-lawsuit-discrimination/
index.html.
122 See Nadler, supra note 92, at 72.
123 See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 86, at 238–39.
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to regulate discrimination in a particular area, we should think about the spil-
lovers for norms as (typically) one of the benefits of regulation.
Despite these benefits, relying on norms rather than law raises a number of
concerns. When we rely on centralized norms put forth by sharing-economy
firms, firms are able to pick and choose their responses. We will be more or
less concerned about this depending on the strength of decentralized antidiscri-
mination norms. To the extent that these decentralized norms mean that a firm
that fails to take action to combat discrimination would lead to a loss of business,
even firms acting purely out of self-interest will be motivated to take antidiscri-
mination measures.124 But even when decentralized antidiscrimination norms are
strong, these will not typically be enough to ensure adequate antidiscrimination
actions by firms, as the public will not have enough information to sanction norm
violations by firms.
Discrimination is an area where we typically want to push for forward
progress, and not simply retain current norms, as one role of antidiscrimination
law has been societal transformation. We see mixed evidence as to whether
norms are leading or lagging law in the context of discrimination in the sharing
economy. On the one hand, norms lead law in that they regulate discrimination
by individual workers and customers that the law generally would not touch.125
On the other hand, norms lag law in that they appear to approve or at least
permit sex discrimination and perhaps even sex segregation that the law would
not tolerate.126 In the era of Trump, we might be especially concerned that
antidiscrimination norms, particularly in some places, have not come as far as
we think.
Some fans of the market might argue that firms are more responsive to
societal norms than lawmakers, as the market provides strong incentives to
respond. But the question is to whom these firms are responding. Firms will be
more inclined to respond to those who make up their user base rather than to
society as a whole. Moreover, firms are not subject to the same level of transpar-
ency or scrutiny as public regulators, which leads to shortcomings in the pub-
lic’s ability to sanction norm violations.127 And when norms fail, there is no
124 I am agnostic as to whether firms here are acting out of genuine concern for discrimination
or out of economic self-interest and only try to disentangle the two where relevant. This recalls
the debate in moral philosophy as to whether altruism is really altruism if acting altruistically
brings the actor utility.
125 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127 See of course the seminal Ronald Coase on transactions costs, of which information costs
are one. The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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guarantee as to the remedies or the process that is due in enforcing these norms
(except as a matter of private contract).128
And, importantly, it’s not just law that shapes norms, but also norms that
shape law. Thus, we must consider how norms established by sharing-economy
firms shape our antidiscrimination law. Scholars have noted how firm policies
can shape juridical conceptions of the proper interpretation and application of
antidiscrimination law, and this is probably true at the legislative level as
well.129 We might imagine that firm responses can have an especially strong
impact on law when firms are the first movers in regulating these areas, and
when the type of conduct being regulated is new, such that firms are not acting
to displace a preexisting norm, but are generating norms from the ground up.130
But the impact might not be limited to the sharing economy. If more permissive
antidiscrimination norms are accepted in the sharing economy, this might have
spillover effects to the regulation of the traditional economy. For example, if
sharing economy firms sex segregate, this may start to seem more acceptable in
the traditional economy as well.
One concern then is that firms might adopt antidiscrimination mechanisms
that are out of sync with the types of goals typically embodied by antidiscrimi-
nation law. We can see this quite clearly with firms’ efforts to address safety
concerns that are perceived as “women’s” problems with sex segregation.131
Another example comes with the depersonalization mechanisms discussed
above, which sometimes rely on making decisionmakers blind to protected traits
to disable their ability to discriminate, a strategy that I refer to as “ignorance as
equality.”132 Ignorance might not be as effective as it appears at first blush. For
128 In reality, even legal enforcement mechanisms are limited by arbitration clauses. See
sources cited supra note 12.
129 See Lauren Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOCIOL.  (); Linda Hamilton Krieger et al., When “Best
Practices” Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Cases, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 843 (2015). We can imagine this would be
true at the legislative level if for no other reason than factors like status quo bias.
130 See Ring, supra note 70.
131 See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that excluding
fertile women from certain jobs based on concerns of fetal safety violated Title VII). But see
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that excluding women from contact position
in prison did not violate Title VII because of safety concerns it created, both for the prisoners
and for the women workers themselves). For a critique of sex segregation as a means to address
safety concerns in the sharing economy, see Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 1056–57.
132 See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, Ignorance as Equality (manuscript in progress) (discuss-
ing and critically engaging the trend by both private firms and in the law of relying on
ignorance to prevent discrimination).
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example, Innclusive, the anonymous alternative to Airbnb, says it “removes the
opportunity for bias” by making guests anonymous, but it still relies on rat-
ings,133 which may be infected by bias.134 Moreover, ignorance as equality robs
decisionmakers of their capacity as full moral agents capable of exercising
meaningful choice. This approach thus diminishes the educative function of
antidiscrimination mechanisms. And relying on ignorance to achieve equality
also places a burden on those who believe they are likely to be discriminated
against to hide who they are,135 and to opt in to less intimate versions of a
transaction to avoid discrimination, even if this is not their preference.136
Still further, the costs of ignorance as equality may be precisely to the
unique value that the sharing economy brings in terms of the generally more
intimate nature of the transactions it offers as compared with the traditional
economy.137 There are costs to both workers and consumers of reducing the
intimacy of sharing-economy transactions based on the utility that intimacy
provides, in terms of promoting the efficiency of the transaction, and even for
the simple reason that some users prefer the intimacy that the sharing economy
can afford.138 Some sharing-economy firms have resisted further shifts towards
anonymity for these reasons.139 And we could even imagine that reducing
intimacy might undermine efforts to combat discrimination, as the more perso-
nal nature of sharing-economy transactions could be harnessed to enhance
enforcement of antidiscrimination norms.140
133 See Ellen Powell, How Can the Gig Economy Address Discrimination? CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.
(Nov 2, 2016), available at https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2016/1102/How-can-the-gig-
economy-address-discrimination.
134 See Alex Rosenblat et al., Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings as Vehicles for
Workplace Discrimination, 9 POL’Y & INTERNET 256 (2017). Or there may be discrimination after
guests arrive at the lodging, such as neighbors calling the police out of concern that black
Airbnb guests were criminals. See Alison Griswald, The Dirty Secret of Airbnb Is That It’s Really,
Really White, QUARTZ (June 23, 2016), available at https://qz.com/706767/racist-hosts-not-
hotels-are-the-greatest-threat-to-airbnbs-business/.
135 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that “guests should not be asked or required to
hide behind curtains of anonymity when trying to fnd a place to stay” and that “[t]echnology
can bring us together and technology shouldn’t ask us to hide who we are”).
136 See Katie Benner, supra note 11 (quoting Professor Jamila Jefferson-Jones as worrying that
“[i]f mainly minorities feel comfortable in using instant bookings to reserve rentals on Airbnb,
for instance, that could end up creating a two-tiered reservations system”).
137 See Schoenbaum, supra note 44, at 466–69.
138 See id.
139 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
140 This is because of the role that the loss of esteem plays in enforcing norms, which one
could imagine is made all the more effective the closer the relationship. See McAdams, supra
note 74, at 364.
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A final concern with firms’ antidiscrimination measures is perhaps the most
troubling: that sharing-economy firms are adopting antidiscrimination measures
precisely in order to avoid legal regulation. Without these measures, there might
be public outrage in response to concerns of discrimination and pressure to
apply antidiscrimination law here. These antidiscrimination measures may allow
the firms to have it both ways: to quell public concern about discrimination
without the expense and burden of regulation by antidiscrimination law.
Conclusion
The focus on regulating discrimination in the sharing economy has been on
whether antidiscrimination law does or does not apply. This overlooks the way
that antidiscrimination norms can operate even without applicable antidiscrimi-
nation law. This Article has examined how antidiscrimination norms can reg-
ulate discrimination in the sharing economy even in the absence of direct legal
regulation, and has considered the role that antidiscrimination law plays in this
phenomenon, even when it does not directly regulate. While antidiscrimination
norms may sometimes be ahead of antidiscrimination law in combatting harm-
ful forms of discrimination, other times antidiscrimination norms may lag
behind the law or be mismatched with its goals, and may suffer from lack of
enforcement. This Article ultimately provides a case study of the state of our
antidiscrimination norms and their relationship to antidiscrimination law that
can serve as a foundation for thinking about future regulation of the sharing
economy.
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